How to Build Reputation in Financial Markets by Mazzola, P. et al.
Mazzola, P., Ravasi, D. & Gabbioneta, C. (2006). How to Build Reputation in Financial Markets. 
Long Range Planning, 39(4), pp. 385-407. doi: 10.1016/j.lrp.2006.09.001 
City Research Online
Original citation: Mazzola, P., Ravasi, D. & Gabbioneta, C. (2006). How to Build Reputation in 
Financial Markets. Long Range Planning, 39(4), pp. 385-407. doi: 10.1016/j.lrp.2006.09.001 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/4597/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
BUILDING REPUTATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
 
Pietro Mazzola  
Economics and Marketing Department  
IULM University 
Via Carlo Bo 1-2, 20143 Milan, Italy 
Tel: +39.02.891412750 
pietro.mazzola@iulm.it 
 
 
 
Davide Ravasi  
Strategic Management Department 
Bocconi University 
Viale Isonzo 23, 20136 Milan, Italy 
Tel. +39.02.5836.2540 
davide.ravasi@unibocconi.it 
 
 
 
Claudia Gabbioneta  
Economics and Marketing Department  
IULM University 
Via Carlo Bo 1-2, 20143 Milan, Italy 
Tel: +39.02.891412747 
claudia.gabbioneta@iulm.it 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper accepted for publications on Long Range Planning 
 2 
ABSTRACT 
Reputation for accountability and trustworthiness is a critical variable affecting a company’s 
capacity to gather the financial resources required to support the realization of corporate 
strategies. However, how companies build and preserve the trust of financial markets is still 
underexplored. Our research highlights the complementary role of leadership, strategic plans and 
internal control systems in underpinning the formation of corporate reputation in financial 
markets. Collectively, our findings indicate how knowledgeable, respected and committed 
leadership, detailed and transparent communication of corporate plans, and credible and 
independent control systems contribute to gather the consensus of the financial community 
around bold strategic plans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of 2001, thanks to an aggressive market strategy, Bipop Carire, which a few 
years earlier was merely a medium-sized local player, had become one of the major regional banks 
in Italy. Earlier on, in order to sustain its fast growth, the bank’s management had turned to the 
stock market. Its daring and innovative growth strategy had gathered the consensus of financial 
analysts and institutional investors, attracted by increasing profits and fascinated by the bold, risk-
taking attitude of its management. In November 2001, however, an investigation carried out by 
the Bank of Italy raised concerns about the proper functioning of the internal control systems: it 
seemed that in the last few years, fast decision making and rapid action had been achieved at the 
expense of accountability and control. These results undermined the confidence of analysts and 
investors in the company’s management. Its shares plummeted, and in mid 2002 Bipop was 
eventually acquired by a large competitor.  
Bipop is not an isolated case. Its case is illustrative of a fundamental tension between risk-
taking and innovation, on one side, and accountability and control, on the other, that affects 
listed companies in major financial markets. In the last few years, we have studied how 
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange, but interacting with a global financial 
community, have addressed this “accountability-risk taking” dilemma. Our research relied on 
several data sources that helped us develop a broad understanding of the factors that underlie – 
or undermine – the capacity to simultaneously address analysts and investors’ concerns for 
accountability and expectations for growth. 
Findings from our research indicate that, in assessing the risk profile of a company and 
the credibility of its growth strategies, financial analysts and investors tend to rely on a range of 
cues, which collectively affect their confidence in the corporate claims and forecasts. More 
specifically, our findings point at the complementary role of a company’s leadership, of the 
structure and content of its strategic plans, and of the perceived accountability of its internal 
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control systems in driving the formation, preservation and loss of consensus around corporate 
strategies. 
 
CORPORATE REPUTATION AND STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE  
Past studies in the fields of finance, accounting and management consistently indicate a 
relationship between the reputation of a company, its top managers or other critical stakeholders, 
and the market performance of its shares (see Exhibit 1).  
 
 
Exhibit 1. Reputation and stock market performance: Findings from past research  
Since the mid 1980s, researchers have studied if and how reputation affects performance on the 
stock market.  
Early research investigated the effects that the association with highly-reputed or 
prestigious actors, such as underwriters and auditors, may bring for companies undergoing initial 
public offerings (IPOs). Beatty and Ritter1 initially observed how IPOs gain higher initial 
valuations when firms recruit prestigious auditors that reassure investors about accounting figures 
and forecasts. Similarly, research by Carter and colleagues2 and Balvers, McDonald and Miller3 
highlighted how IPOs reduce underpricing by associating with prestigious underwriters and 
reputed investment bankers. Collectively, these studies suggest that the endorsement of highly 
reputed stakeholders reduces the perceived risk in corporate plans and help a company increase 
the amount of capital raised in the offering, as well as influencing post-IPO volumes and share 
price performance.   
Later research focused on the personal reputation of chief executive officers, board 
members as well as members of the top management team, showing how their prestige positively 
influences the behaviour of financial markets in extraordinary occasions such as bankruptcies, 
takeovers. D’Aveni and Hambrick4, for instance, suggest that bankruptcy occurs when creditors 
withdraw their support from a firm’s top management and that support for the top team depends 
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upon the team’s prestige. In a later study, D’Aveni and Kesner5 highlight how the power and 
connection of managers deeply affect their responses to takeovers. Furthermore, CEO and 
management reputation has been shown to influence the perceived credibility of corporate 
communication6 and to help the company acquire much needed internal and external consensus 
to implement its strategies7.  
A number of other studies traced several links between the reputation of organizational 
leaders and the success of initial public offerings. According to Higgins and Gulati8, for instance, 
the experience of organizational leaders legitimizes young firms to critical resource-holders and 
help the former secure the endorsement of prestigious underwriters, with positive impact on the 
success of their IPOs. Jackson and Hambrick9 found evidence that top managers’ prestigious ties 
attract prestigious backers, and both of these factors influence initial IPO valuation. In a study of 
the biotechnology industry, Finkle10 observed how prestigious board members help young 
ventures reduce their gap in managerial resources and thus contribute to lower underpricing and 
to increase IPO size. Similarly, Cohen and Dean11 and Certo, Daily and Dalton12 state that the 
legitimacy of, respectively, top management teams and board of directors was negatively 
associated with post-IPO stock value run-up.  
More recently, research focus seems to have shifted from personal to corporate 
reputation and from its effects on stock market price, both under normal as well as extraordinary 
circumstances. These studies converge on the idea that corporate reputation affect stock market 
performance, in that it indirectly influences a company market value through its impact on 
operational performance, it helps a company attract capital at a lower cost than rivals, and it helps 
reducing the perceived financial risk of company’s shares.              
 
For a company, being held in high regard seems to indirectly affect market value13, possibly 
through its positive impact on operational performance and profitability14. However, good 
reputation among financial analysts and institutional investors also helps a company become an 
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‘investment of choice’, enhancing its ability to attract capital and to do it at a lower cost than 
rivals. 15 On the one hand, market perceptions of the company’s future prospects tend to 
influence the level of demand for a company’s shares, hence its market capitalization. On the 
other hand, analysts and investors tend to consider well regarded companies as comparatively less 
risky. In these cases they seem to be willing to accept higher financial risk for the same level of 
returns or lower returns for the same level of risk16.  
Also, companies with stronger reputation seem to face market volatility better than those 
with weaker reputation. During market crises, corporate reputation may act as a reservoir of 
goodwill, helping companies recover from drops of share prices faster than poorly regarded 
companies17. Similarly, research shows that shares of companies that enjoy a good reputation 
suffer less and recover faster from stock market crashes due to corporate crises – product recalls, 
financial scandals, etc. – than shares of poorly regarded companies do18. 
Reputational capital, then, seems to be a valuable asset and an important component of 
market value, along with its physical, financial and intellectual capital19. Despite its increasingly 
evident importance, however, how companies can build and leverage on their reputation among 
analysts and investors is still an underexplored area.  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Between 2002 and 2004, we have studied extensively the formation of corporate reputation 
among financial analysts and investors. Our research relied on a number of sequential stages 
which were meant to i) develop an understanding of how financial analysts and investors assess 
corporate strategies and react to corporate action and communication, ii) identify exemplary cases 
of construction or loss of reputation among financial audiences, iii) investigate these cases tracing 
a connection between corporate actions and consensus on the stock market. During each stage, 
additional evidence was gathered from new data sources, in order to test, extend or refine insights 
generated in previous stages. 
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In a preliminary phase, 37 semi-structured interviews with international sell-side and buy-
side analysts and 15 semi-structured interviews with investor relation officers helped us 
familiarize with the object of our research. In particular, it helped us develop a better 
understanding of how sell-side financial analysts assess corporate plans and forecasts and how 
they formulate their recommendations. This phase also generated insight on the interaction 
between managers and investor relation officers of listed companies and between the various 
actors in the financial community.  
Based on indications gathered in preliminary interviews, we prepared a questionnaire, 
investigating dimensions of corporate reputation among financial analysts, which was distributed 
to 350 analysts, 60 of which replied (15% of the analysts covering stocks listed on the Milan 
Stock Exchange). The questionnaire aimed at fleshing out central issues affecting how analysts 
evaluate companies, by testing insights emerging from the previous stage. Our results pointed at 
the relevance of corporate leadership, governance mechanisms and corporate communication – 
along with financial performance – in driving analysts’ evaluations20. Indirectly, our results also 
helped us distinguish, based on quantitative evidence, highly regarded companies from poorly 
reputed ones. 
As both the content of the interviews and the results of the questionnaire pointed at the 
relevance of corporate communication in affecting reputation among the financial community, 
we content-analysed 62 strategic plans presented to the financial community by companies listed 
at the Milan Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2004. Additional data about the plans – how they 
were presented, by whom, etc. – was gathered through an archival search. Next, we looked at the 
short-term variation of the stock price right after the presentation, as well as at comments and 
reactions of the financial community – both in the financial press and in analysts’ reports – for 
evidence that helped us discriminate between effective and ineffective plans and presentations. A 
comparative analysis helped us identify the distinctive traits of plans that seemed to positively or 
negatively influence the evaluations and reactions of financial analysts and investors21.  
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In addition, as preliminary interviews had highlighted connections between reputation 
and internal control systems, we analyzed mandatory corporate governance annual reports. 
Supplementary information gathered on twelve companies, selected on the basis of indications 
collected in previous stages, helped us trace the configuration of their internal control systems 
and structures, and to study the actual composition and the role of internal auditing committees. 
Additional interviews with analysts and investors helped us capture reactions of the financial 
community to how governance structures and internal control systems were designed and 
communicated, and surfaced features that seemed to be beneficial – or detrimental – to the 
evaluation of financial analysts.  
Finally, in order to sharpen our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the 
formation of reputation in financial markets, we selected and studied ten exemplary cases of 
effective or ineffective management of relationships with the financial community (see Table 2). 
Evidence collected in prior phases guided the selection of cases and events to be investigated 
more in depth. Data collection relied on archival search of published documents, press articles 
and releases, and semi-structured interviews with managers and members of the financial 
community. Again, we looked at analysts’ reports, press interviews and changes in stock prices 
for evidence of increasing or decreasing consensus around the corporate plans. Data analysis 
helped us refine and link insights emerging from previous stages, and develop an overall 
explanatory framework for the phenomenon under study. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
BUILDING AND PRESERVING REPUTATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS  
 
Listed companies in major financial markets face a fundamental tension: on the one hand, they 
feel the pressure of analysts and investors for two-digit growth: innovative, risky strategies seem 
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to be crucial in preserving the consensus of the financial community and in avoiding that highly 
mobile capital will quickly migrate towards more promising investments. On the other hand, a 
recent wave of corporate scandals seems to have heightened the sensitivity of analysts and 
investors to the trustworthiness of corporate leaders, the credibility of corporate claims, and the 
proper functioning of internal control systems. Effectively building and preserving trust and 
consensus among the financial community, therefore, requires the capacity to simultaneously 
address coexisting pressures for continuous growth through wealth creating innovation, and 
widespread expectations about appropriate strategic conduct and governance practices. In this 
respect, findings from our research indicate that highly regarded companies are able to provide 
financial analysts and investors with a broad range of cues, reassuring them about the credibility 
of corporate claims and forecasts. One of our informants explicitly connected the capacity to 
raise consensus around strategic plans with the reputation that a company enjoyed among its 
financial audiences: 
There are companies that are considered reliable, and analysts believe them regardless of how 
challenging their targets appear. Others are considered as less reliable and analysts are sceptical even 
when their forecasts are conservative. The truth is that the financial community seems to be 
inclined to trust – or mistrust – companies largely regardless of the actual content of their strategies.  
 
In this respect, our research suggests that a company’s reputation among analysts and 
investors – and the related capacity to aggregate consensus around risk-taking strategies – rests 
on synergy among three elements (Figure 1): a reputed and committed leadership, detailed and 
realistic presentations of strategic plans, and credible and independent internal control systems. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
-------------------------- 
 
A knowledgeable, respected and committed leadership  
Research on investor relations and financial disclosure indicates that management quality and 
personal factors are of high interest for analysts and investors22, and that interpersonal 
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interactions with managers are central to understanding how these factors contribute to stock 
market performance23. In this respect, our findings indicate that the personal reputation of top 
managers and whether and how they personally engage in relationships with the financial 
community have considerable impact on the consensus of the latter around the corporate plans 
(Table 3).  
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
-------------------------- 
 
First, as analysts and investors find themselves facing plans and environments fraught 
with uncertainties, the personal reputation of a company’s CEO and a strong record of past 
achievements are likely to reassure the financial community about his/her capacity to deliver the 
promised results in the future. Research consistently shows that the reputation and prestige of a 
company’s CEO and its top management team positively affect the behaviour of financial 
markets in extraordinary occasions such as IPOs, bankruptcies or takeovers. Even under normal 
circumstances, the reputation of a company may benefit from association with prestigious top 
managers, as the reputation of corporate leaders tends to affect the perceived credibility of 
corporate communication, and their personal aura and charisma may help the company garner 
the internal and external consensus required to implement its strategies.  
In the cases we analyzed, when highly reputed CEOs moved from one company to 
another, considerable variations in the value of the respective stocks were frequently observed, as 
the financial markets revised their evaluations of the corporate prospects in light of the gain or 
loss of a credible leader. Such were the cases, for instance, of Andrea Guerra moving from home-
appliance manufacturer Indesit (formerly, Merloni Elettrodomestici) to luxury eyewear producer 
Luxottica, or Corrado Passera moving from Poste Italiane to BancaIntesa (see Table 3). Hiring a 
respected top manager, then, may be an important step in building or recovering reputation 
among the financial audiences (see Exhibit 2).  
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Exhibit 2. Rebuilding trust at Capitalia 
Capitalia, is a large banking group born in July 2002 from the integration of Bancaroma Group 
and Bipop. At that time, both groups didn’t enjoy a good reputation in financial markets: 
Bancaroma was perceived as an old, conservative and poorly performing institution, strongly 
affected by political interests; Bipop, as we have mentioned in the introduction, had been under 
investigation by the Bank of Italy, the Italian authority for the banking industry. Analysts’ reports 
were sceptical about the management’s capacity to carry out their plans24. The alleged implication 
of Capitalia in large financial scandals, Parmalat and Cirio among them, contributed to reinforce 
the mistrust of the financial community. 
This embarrassing situation urged Cesare Geronzi, Chairman of Capitalia, to take 
measures to regain the trust of the financial community. In July 2003, Matteo Arpe was 
appointed CEO of Capitalia at the age of 39. Before arriving at Capitalia, Mr Arpe had worked as 
central director in Mediobanca, the largest and most prestigious merchant bank in Italy, which he 
had eventually left in 1999 to become vice-president of the Italian branch of Lehman Brothers 
and responsible for M&A Europe. In both assignments, his excellent performance had earned 
him a solid reputation for competence and transparency. On the day after he was appointed, the 
financial markets saluted his arrival with a substantial raise in the stock price of the company. 
Soon after, leveraging on his personal reputation Mr. Arpe managed to tighten up the consensus 
of the financial community around essentially the same restructuring plan that a year earlier had 
raised much scepticism, and in two months, Capitalia’s shares went up by 40%.   
 
The effect of a top manager’s prestige and personal reputation seems to be amplified by 
his/her personal involvement in investor relations and financial communication. Research indicates that, on 
average, analysts and investors tend to interact mostly with the CFO and the investor relations 
officers, seldom with the chairman or the CEO25. However, when asked about with whom they 
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would like to have more contact, both groups overwhelmingly indicate the CEO. Investor 
relations officers are often perceived as gatekeepers rather than providers of information. 
Conversely, investors and analysts like to discuss their concerns and impressions with managers, 
since through direct interaction they believe to develop a better understanding of a company’s 
performance and future prospects. As one of our informants remarked: 
To me it is important to understand who’s leading the company. I want to look into his eyes and 
understand his three-year vision for the company and his commitment to the achievement of the 
corporate goals. 
 
In particular, analysts appreciate reviewing their models and interpretations with company 
managers, in order to test their understanding of the company’s businesses, and to be reassured 
that their own projections, deductions, and calculations capture reality appropriately.  
Despite this evidence, in many companies the importance of CEO’s and top managers’ 
involvement in investor relations seems to be still underestimated. As an investor relation 
manager at Telecom Italia remarked, top and line managers may feel uncomfortable in diverting 
their time and attention from their day-to-day operations. As a consequence, several financial 
analysts we interviewed lamented the apparent lack of commitment of many top managers, who 
– with a few notable exceptions such as Unicredito’s Alessandro Profumo and Andrea Guerra, 
formerly at Indesit – rarely participated to meetings with the financial community or did not 
display an open and responsive attitude. Corrado Passera, CEO of Banca Intesa, seems to be an 
outstanding exception in this matter (see Exhibit 3). 
  
Exhibit 3. Corrado Passera and Banca Intesa  
Born from the merger of ex state-owned Banca Commerciale Italiana, Cariplo and Banco 
Ambrosiano Veneto, Banca Intesa was at the time the second largest banking group in Italy by 
total revenues. Since its foundation, the new bank group had enjoyed a poor reputation in 
financial markets, being perceived as an old and static institution, unable to successfully complete 
 13 
the post merger phase. This situation changed in 2002, when Corrado Passera was appointed 
CEO of the bank. Mr Passera had previously been CEO of three companies: Gruppo Editoriale 
L’Espresso (a large media conglomerate), Olivetti (at that time, a producer of office and system 
solutions) and Poste Italiane (the public provider of mailing services). As CEO of Poste Italiane, 
he had been able to lead an overstaffed, inertial and traditionally poor performing company 
through major restructuring, substantially improving the company’s image and performance. 
These results were acknowledged by the financial markets as they eventually welcomed his arrival 
at Banca Intesa with a substantial increase in the company’s share price26.  
Later, the company’s reputation among the financial community has benefited also from 
Mr Passera’s direct involvement in investor relations and communication to financial markets. 
Not only has he presented the latest strategic plan personally, but he would also regularly attend 
meetings with financial analysts and institutional investors to provide additional explanations 
about the information disclosed by the company. According to the financial press and 
community, in September 2002, during the illustration of the 2003-2005 strategic plan, his 
reassuring presence and effective presentation helped convince analysts and investors of the 
credibility of ambitious earning forecasts27. As a financial analyst reported later: “The latest 
presentation showed a clear break with tradition in Italian banks’ usual approach to financial 
communication. In an innovative scene, Mr. Passera, in shirtsleeves, made the presentation alone 
(…) whilst striding around the stage. The emotive impact was strong, giving the impression that 
the CEO is the sole leader in the bank, with the situation well under control and clear ideas in 
mind.” 
 
Finally, while personal prestige and commitment obviously have a positive influence on 
the audience, our research suggests that profound knowledge of the business, of its key value drivers 
and economics, is fundamental in gathering the consensus of the financial community. 
Developing an intimate understanding of the business is fundamental to “crafting” good 
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strategies and help managers formulate and implement challenging but realistic strategies28. Also, 
financial analysts and investors tend to appreciate a manager’s solid knowledge of the business 
and its practical aspects, because it reassures them about their capacity to carry out the proposed 
plans, regardless of occasional unforeseen events that may require rapid changes in the strategic 
course of the company. In this respect, relatively small companies such as component producer 
Sabaf and the luxury group Tod’s have earned visibility and respect among financial analysts 
based on the experience and competence of their founders and CEOs (see Table 3).  
Take for instance the case of Tod’s, a luxury conglomerate, around which the CEO and 
major shareholder Diego Della Valle has managed to preserve the trust and consensus of the 
financial community despite occasional poor operational performance. Tod’s was formally 
founded in 1986 by Diego Della Valle, whose family had been producing shoes since the early 
1900. Since the mid 70’s, Mr Della Valle had been running the family business gradually 
transforming a family-operated small concern into a medium-sized industrial company. Since 
Tod’s went public in October 2000, the company has steadily expanded its brand portfolio and 
product range, turning into the operating holding of a group which now includes footwear 
brands Tod’s and Hogan, and casual wear Fay. In recent years, the group has adopted a 
challenging strategy, based on the simultaneous expansion of its geographic scope, its network of 
proprietary stores, and its product range. Despite recent poor performance – not only has the 
company not grown significantly in the last years, but in 2003 it experienced also a substantial 
reduction in net profits and EBITDA – the confidence of financial analysts and investors in the 
long term growth prospects never faltered. According to prominent members of the financial 
community, Mr. Della Valle’s insight in the luxury market and his considerable experience of the 
industrial and commercial aspects of the business support his capacity to articulate his plans 
during his frequent meetings with analyst and investors, and reassure them about the foundation 
of his forecasts29. 
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Strategic plans, sensegiving and the reduction of ambiguity 
Past research has observed how strategic plans may act as consensus catalysts inside and outside 
the company30. In particular, within the financial community, periodic presentations of strategic 
plans to financial analysts and investors are among the most important devices to disclose 
information about company’s strategic intentions, action plans and expected results31.  
As we comparatively analysed how companies illustrate their plans to the financial 
community, we observed high heterogeneity in content and structure. Evidence from our study, 
however, indicates that how a company communicates its strategies may substantially affect its 
reputation in the financial community, and points at three factors that seem to affect the 
perceptions and evaluations of analysts and investors (Table 4). 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
-------------------------- 
 
First, good presentations of strategic plans do not merely indicate goals and expected 
results, but provide a clear and consistent explanation of the causal relationships linking environmental trends, 
strategic intentions, action plans, and the end results. Strategic plans are often surrounded by 
uncertainties regarding environmental changes, competitors’ moves, and market reactions. Even 
in relatively stable competitive contexts, uncertainty and ambiguity are intrinsic to critical stages 
in the lifetime of a company such as mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, repositioning, 
takeovers, etc32. Helping analysts and investors make sense of emerging competitive contexts and 
innovative strategies and business models, then, is central to investor relations and corporate 
communication33.  
Evidence from our research suggests that highly-regarded companies tend to use 
presentations of strategic plans as a “sensegiving” device, to support managers’ efforts to 
influence how financial analysts interpret the company’s strategy in relations to its competitive 
context. The notion of sensegiving refers to a deliberate attempt to influence how others make 
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sense of an ambiguous reality34. By explaining in detail how they intend to reach their goals, 
companies like Indesit, Unicredito, Banca Intesa and e.Biscom, now Fastweb, (see Tables 2 and 
4) seemed to help analysts and investors develop an informed understanding of the causal texture 
underlying their plans. By providing analysts with a thorough and consistent map of cause-and-
effect links by which specific actions are expected to lead to specific results35, managers can 
reduce the ambiguity associated to their plans and reinforce the perceived credibility of their 
strategies. Furthermore, as a sell-side analyst describing Indesit’s latest strategic plan observed, 
clearly articulating managers’ assumptions about environmental trends and their links with 
corporate actions and results may be beneficial even at a later stage: 
Such a detailed plan facilitates honest and loyal interaction between analysts and managers, so that 
in the future, if they haven’t reached their targets, we can sit around a table and analyze results in 
light of their assumptions about, say, the cost of raw materials, and of what really happened […] It 
helps figure out what they can be blamed for and what was out of their control. Even if they make a 
mistake, their reputation may not be affected. Not too much, at least. 
 
Conversely, presentations of strategic plans that contain ambiguous, incomplete 
information may aggravate analysts’ and investors’ attempts to make sense of a company’s 
strategies and environmental context. Companies whose future plans are surrounded by 
uncertainty, in turn, are penalized by financial markets (see Exhibit 4).  
 
Exhibit 4. Ambiguous communication at Telecom Italia 
Telecom Italia has been for long time a state owned company and the only provider of 
telecommunication services in Italy. In late 90’s, deregulation and privatisation occurred: a new 
management was appointed at the head of Telecom and new competitors entered the 
telecommunication industry. Explaining financial analysts and investors how the new managers 
intended to steer the company through this fluid and highly uncertain competitive context was 
critical.  
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In late September 1998, a press release issued by Telecom Italia summarized the key 
figures of the 1999 – 2001 strategic plan approved by the board of directors under the leadership 
of the recently hired CEO Gian Mario Rossignolo, a well respect senior officer with a long 
experience in managing large companies. The plan was expected to contain detailed information 
about the new goals and strategies of the company. A few days later, however, Bloomberg 
diffused different figures, implying a declining income, based on an internal company document 
distributed to labour unions.  
These data were soon indicated as “incomplete” and “misleading” by the chief financial 
officer, but the rising ambiguity surrounding the corporate plans negatively affected the 
confidence of investors in the assumptions underlying the plan. In the following days, despite the 
efforts of the top managers to regain trust in their forecasts, the stock price fell about 25%. Far 
from improving analysts and investors’ understanding of how managers at Telecom Italia 
planned to address the rising environmental challenges, the new plans and how they were 
communicated actually increased the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the company’s 
strategies and its capacity to carry them out. Serious concerns about the company and its 
management arose in the financial community36. On October 26, the chief executive officer 
resigned.  
 
Evidence from our research, however, suggests that, while clearly and unambiguously 
relating corporate strategies with environmental trends is important, effective presentations of 
strategic plans tend to provide also comprehensive and detailed information about the implementation of the 
proposed plans. While intentions are important, how a strategy is actually implemented is critical for 
its success37. As one of our informants remarked: 
Many companies tell you that they’ll do this and they’ll do that, but you never understand how they 
really intend to do it. If somebody comes to me and tells me its earnings will increase in three years 
by 10%, but he’s not able to explain me how, how can I believe him? 
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Corporate success rests on the possession of unique and valuable resources and 
competences38. In this respect, it is not surprising that financial analysts and investors tend to 
appreciate precise information about key tangible and intangible assets that the plan will rely on, 
and help them assess their adequacy to reach the company’s targets. Furthermore, as divisional 
and business unit managers are gradually accorded more decision making discretion and have 
become more individually accountable for results than in the past, their responsibility for strategy 
implementation is increasing39. In these respects, effective presentations of plans may augment 
the credibility of a company’s strategies by providing analysts and investors with detailed 
information about the management team that will be responsible for carrying out the plans, the 
corporate resources that can be mobilized, the external alliances that will be engaged, etc40. In 
absence of clarity about these issues, plans may be perceived as little more than aspirations of 
arguable credibility. In the early 2000’s, for instance, the vagueness of the restructuring plans that 
were periodically presented to the financial community seems to have contributed to Alitalia’s 
poor reputation among financial analysts and investors. As an analyst we interviewed observed 
about a recently presented plan: 
The new management told us that they were going to turn the company around. If you asked them 
how, they would say: “We’ll increase turnover with new investments” – but they were in no 
conditions of borrowing more money. “We’ll cut the cost of labour” – but then when they talked 
with the trade unions they denied it. “We’ll be more efficient” – but it was not clear how…  
 
Unicredito, the first Italian banking group in terms of market capitalization, is an 
exemplary case of how companies may effectively address these demands (see Exhibit 5).  
 
Exhibit 5. Presenting corporate plans at Unicredito 
Unicredito was born in 1998 from the aggregation of five banks (Credito Italiano, Rolo Banca 
1473, Cariverona, Cassa di Risparmio di Torino, and Cassamarca). Since its foundation, the 
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company has been able to aggregate the consensus of the financial community around an 
ambitious growth strategy aimed at becoming the leading group on the Italian market. The 
company’s presentations of strategic plans have been highly appreciated by the financial 
community. As one of our informants observed: “What I liked in the presentation of their latest 
strategic plan was the fundamental balance between the various parts. They did not only describe 
in detail the company’s targets, but also provided us with a detailed explanation of how they were 
planning to reach them […] which made their targets look more convincing”.  
In October 2004, the presentation to analysts and institutional investors of the 2005-2007 
plan was structured around a detailed articulation of the ambitious restructuring plan into 
divisional sub-plans, personally illustrated by divisional managers, who explained how plans 
would be implemented in their divisions and indicated who would be responsible for them. 
Reactions of financial analysts consistently emphasized the “credibility”, and “feasibility” of the 
cost-cutting plan proposed by the corporate managers, insofar as, as one analyst observed, it 
“provided answers to most of the ‘hot’ issues”.   
 
Finally, a third feature that seems to positively affect the effectiveness of presentations of 
strategic plans and enhance the credibility of corporate forecasts is the periodic follow-ups on the 
advances towards the expected results. The provision of periodical follow-ups on the advances towards 
the results contained in previous presentations tends to reassure analysts and investors about the 
companies’ commitment to the implementation of its plans. Financial audiences are not only 
interested in the extent to which expected results have been achieved; they are also interested in 
understanding if, when, why and how managers have modified their plans41. Not all the intended 
strategies are realized: plans may change and companies may flexibly adapt to evolving 
circumstances as new strategies emerge and modify old plans42. In this respect, strategic plans 
may help internal as well as external audiences track the realization of intended strategies and 
evaluate the results of plans that were actually carried out. Tracking and monitoring the progress 
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of corporate plans and comparing expected and actual results is central to analysts’ activity and an 
essential part of their reports. As one of our informants observed: 
Continuously updating us on the “state of the art” is fundamental. And even more so when we are 
dealing with an innovative strategy or a new project, and we are trying to keep track of its results.  
 
In Italy, however, only a few listed companies provide the financial community with 
periodical follow-ups of their presentations of strategic plans. e.Biscom, now Fastweb, is an 
exemplary case of how engaging in constant conversation with the financial community through 
systematic follow-ups on presentations of strategic plans, may help build and maintain the 
support of analysts and investors even in the face of persistent – albeit expected – lack of 
profitability. e.Biscom was founded in 1999, as a financial holding in the field of 
telecommunication and broadband services, by Silvio Scaglia, former CEO of Omnitel – the 
second largest Italian provider of mobile telephony, now part of the Vodafone group. A year 
later, the company went public. As the Internet bubble exploded, however, senior managers at 
e.Biscom had to strive hard to preserve the confidence of analysts and investors in the feasibility 
of their plans, while many promising start-ups around them failed. Communication was frequent 
and comprehensive. Quarterly and annual results were systematically compared with forecasts 
contained in earlier presentations. In October 2004, the newly crafted presentation of strategic 
plan went to the length of illustrating in details how managers’ forecasts and corporate results 
had evolved throughout all the plans presented in previous years. The meticulous comparison 
was meant to reaffirm the original strategic vision – i.e. pursuing organic growth in core business 
of broadband telecommunication services in Italy – and to provide compelling evidence that the 
company had systematically respected targets stated since the year 2000, reassuring the financial 
community that break-even would be reached in 2005.  
 
Effective, credible and independent internal control systems 
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Finally, a third factor affecting the credibility of corporate plans among analysts and investors 
seems to be the configuration of internal control systems. Recent research indicates that financial 
analysts and investors tend to agree on the importance of internal control systems both for 
corporate accountability and for the future success of the business43. Compliance to national 
regulations and code of conducts is obviously a minimum requirement. What seems to make the 
difference between highly and poorly regarded companies, however, is not so much the 
establishment of sophisticated internal control systems per se, but reassuring external audiences 
about their effective functioning. In this respect, three features seem to positively affect the 
evaluation of financial analysts and investors (Table 5).  
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 here 
-------------------------- 
 
First, highly-reputed companies tend to voluntarily disclose detailed and reliable information about 
their auditing practices beyond the legal requirements, providing evidence of the real functioning of the 
internal control systems. Recent research shows that voluntary reporting on internal control 
systems provides additional and valuable information for financial analysts and investors, 
improves accountability and provides a better indicator of a company’s long-term viability44. In 
fact, financial audiences find it difficult to distinguish between effective internal control systems 
and mere formal compliance to regulations. As one of our informants observed: 
Take the case of independent outside directors. […] In a family firm we can even have a majority of 
outside directors, but most of them will be family friends or worse. How independent can they be? 
[…] What matters is to understand who really controls the company and who influences decisions, 
regardless of the formal governance practices. 
 
In this respect, disclosing comprehensive and precise information about actual auditing 
activities – such as the background of the auditors, number of meetings per year, the average 
length of meetings, the number of auditors attending meetings, etc. –, and issuing reports on 
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internal control may reduce the uncertainties surrounding control structures and systems, and 
may provide a more convincing account of their actual functioning. Furthermore, some of our 
informants perceived it as a sign of above average commitment to transparency and of 
confidence in the effectiveness of internal control systems. 
At the time of our research, however, voluntary disclosure of extensive information about 
auditing activities seemed to be still uncommon, at least among Italian companies. Our 
comparative study of the composition and the activity of audit committees in Italian listed 
companies, for instance, revealed that while most companies declared to have established internal 
control systems, many of them did not really have an audit committee nor had they appointed an 
internal auditor. While the activity of internal auditors generally complied with the current 
regulations, they rarely seemed to go beyond their legal duties. Furthermore, auditors seemed to 
focus mainly on operational auditing, assets allocation and financial auditing, while overlooking 
other important activities, such as budgeting control, competitive strategy appraisal, and the 
evaluation of division productivity. In some cases, also, internal auditors met so rarely and for so 
short periods of time to cast serious doubts about the actual content of their work. Most of this 
information, however, was usually not available to the financial community – or at least not in 
such detail. 
Conversely, highly regarded companies tend to engage in broad and detailed disclosure of 
the actual functioning of their auditing practices, providing convincing evidence of the 
effectiveness of their internal control systems. Take, for instance, the case of Indesit, a large 
continental producer of home-appliances. In the last few years, managers at Indesit have 
increasingly acknowledged the importance of disclosing information about the real functioning of 
company’s internal control systems. In fact, the annual corporate governance report of the 
company goes beyond mandatory requirements, illustrating the various processes designed to 
reassure stakeholders about the achievement of business objectives, regarding in particular the 
efficiency of business operations, the reliability of financial information, legal compliance, and 
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more in general, the preservation of the integrity of the company’s assets. The report describes in 
detail the main features of internal control systems – i.e. definition, communication of objectives 
and levels of responsibility; planning, monitoring and risk assessment, human resources 
management – and the various controls carried out by individual business functions in order to 
guarantee their operating efficiency. Finally, the report clearly explains the role of the internal 
control manager and of the internal control committee and illustrates in details their composition 
and current activities. 
As far as the composition of auditing structures and their location in the managerial 
hierarchies is concerned, financial audiences seem to appreciate also a clear distinction between control 
duties and managerial responsibilities: Ideally, an internal auditor should not belong to or come from 
the managerial ranks, lest his real independence from top managers and impartiality may be 
questioned. In fact, need for fast responses to environmental changes may induce managers to 
by-pass control systems. The accountability of innovative, risk-taking strategies may be 
overlooked in favour of fast growth. Such a situation may encourage the adoption of perfunctory 
procedures and internal controllers who in fact report directly to the CEO. In the United States, 
the need for independent internal control systems has been acknowledged by a recently 
introduced regulation45. Yet formal compliance with the rules does not necessarily guarantee real 
independence of audit committee members and of internal auditors from management. As we 
have mentioned in the introduction, the recent experience of Bipop is illustrative of a how 
formally effective internal control systems may result into purely formal bodies, subjected to the 
management’s will (see Exhibit 6). 
 
Exhibit 6. The rise and fall of Bipop 
Between 1993 and 2000 Bipop developed a bold and innovative strategy, based on aggressive 
expansion through acquisitions, which earned the company excellent operating results and a 
leading position in the Italian banking industry. The company’s unconventional strategy aimed at 
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increasing earnings through revenue growth driven mainly by non-interest income, and through 
cost reduction thanks to innovative distribution. Such strategy was indeed more risky than 
competitors’ because of the higher correlation with market performance. Nevertheless financial 
audiences were enthusiast. In February 1999, a primary international brokerage house argued that 
Bipop was “possibly the most advanced and dynamic of the regional banks, […] with particular 
strengths in leasing and asset management within the Italian banking industry”. The report 
concluded inserting Bipop “among the highest quality, and most innovative of the Italian 
banks”46.  
In mid 2001, even in the face of a declining share price, Bipop was still considered among 
the best performers in the industry. In the following months, however, Bipop entered a profound 
crisis, which eventually led to the replacement of the whole top management team and to the 
acquisition by a larger but far less dynamic competitor. The crisis precipitated when an 
investigation of the Bank of Italy found internal control systems to be insufficient to cope with 
the high risk profile associated to the company’s aggressive strategy. In particular, investigators 
pointed out that, in fact, internal auditors reported directly to the CEO, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of internal controls. Accountability and control had been sacrificed in order to 
remove any hindrance to the discretion of senior officers. When, soon after, some board 
members and some managers were accused of accounting frauds, the reputation of the bank was 
shattered, its risk profile became unacceptable for most shareholders, and despite the potential 
profitability of its strategies, its share price crashed.  
 
Finally, the appointment of internal auditors characterized by a personal reputation for 
integrity and rigor may help companies reinforce the credibility of their internal control systems 
among the financial community. Research on IPOs indicates that the association with a 
prestigious auditing firm tends to increase the amount of capital raised in the offering, as it 
reduces the perceived uncertainty about the value of company’s shares. In fact, not only external 
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but also internal auditors may affect how financial audiences assess the uncertainty surrounding a 
company’s prospects, as the appointment of internal auditors with a strong reputation for 
independence, integrity and rigor seems to reassure the financial community about the 
accountability of the company’s operations.  
In fact, for poorly reputed companies, association with well regarded internal and external 
auditors may be a way to build or reinforce the confidence of analysts and investors in their 
commitment to improve the transparency and reliability of their operations. Again, consider the 
case of Capitalia. Besides the appointment of Mr. Arpe described earlier on, another important 
step in regaining the confidence of financial audiences was the appointment of Giuseppe 
Cannizzaro, a former member of Consob (the Italian Stock Exchange Commission), as internal 
auditor, with the formal title of central director and legal counsellor of the company. At Consob, 
Mr Cannizzaro had been in charge of the consultancy and regulation office within the Legal 
Consultancy Division and, later, had been responsible for the Securities Division, where his 
duties included controlling that listed companies provided financial markets with correct and 
transparent information, revising annual and quarterly reports, and controlling listed companies’ 
governance structures and mechanisms. His appointment as internal auditor was welcomed by 
the financial community as a serious effort to put effective corporate governance structures and 
mechanisms in place, and to improve the accountability of the company.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Common wisdom and past studies tell us that competitive success and above average profitability 
are fundamental in earning a good reputation among financial analysts and institutional investors. 
Our research, however, indicates that financial audiences may develop a more or less favourable 
attitude towards a company and its strategy based also on the way senior officers and investor 
relation officers illustrate their plans and internal control systems to their financial audiences,  
(see Table 6 for a summary). 
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 -------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 here 
-------------------------- 
 
Financial analysts and institutional investors are constantly engaged in monitoring and 
evaluating corporate plans and results. In doing so, they have to make sense of an uncertain and 
ambiguous reality, relying mostly on information provided by the companies themselves. 
Appraising the relative credibility of corporate claims and forecasts, then, is fundamental to the 
assessment of corporate plans and the estimate of the expected future earnings.   
In our research, converging evidence from different data sources indicates that some 
companies are generally perceived by the financial community as more reliable, trustworthy and 
accountable than others. In turn, this reputation for trustworthiness and accountability seems to 
positively affect the capacity of these companies to gather the consensus of financial audiences 
required to carry out ambitious strategic plans. Findings from our research helped us track the 
formation of a positive reputation among financial analysts and institutional investors down to a 
range of factors that seem to help financial audiences make sense of corporate strategies and 
reassure them about the credibility of corporate claims and ambitions. 
More specifically, our study highlights the importance of knowledgeable and respected 
corporate leaders engaging in a constant conversation with financial analysts, providing them 
with a rich and compelling account of corporate plans and a detailed illustration of how they are 
to be implemented. Also, frequent updates and follow-ups of strategic plans and the voluntary 
disclosure of comprehensive information about the real functioning of internal control systems 
seem to converge in gathering and preserving the consensus of financial audiences around 
ambitious and challenging growth strategies.  
The experience of companies such as Bipop and e.Biscom is illustrative of how financial 
analysts and investors tend to display a different attitude towards innovative, risky strategies 
according to the different perceptions they have of the company’s trustworthiness and 
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accountability. In other words, financial audiences tend to evaluate fast-growing, market 
aggressive strategies of well regarded companies more positively than similar strategies developed 
by poorly regarded companies. In this respect, our findings suggest that innovative and risky 
strategies may actually coexist with strong internal control systems, as companies leverage on 
their perceived accountability and trustworthiness to aggregate the consensus of the financial 
community around their strategies. 
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Table 1: Reputation and stock market performance: Findings from past research  
 
Corporate reputation…  
 
…is associated to higher market performance 
 
 
 
Knight, & Pretty (1990); Gregory (1998); Black, Carnes, & Richardson 
(2000). 
 
…reduces the perceived financial risk of a company’s shares 
 
Lehn, Netter, & Poulsen (1990); Chaney, & Lewis (1995);  Healy, & 
Palepu (1995); Gardiol, Gibson-Anser, & Tuschschmid (1997); Srivastava, 
McInish, Wood, & Capraro (1997). 
 
CEO reputation…  
 
…affects the reaction of financial markets in extraordinary circumstances, 
such as IPOs, bankruptcies or takeovers 
 
 
D’Aveni (1990); Hambrick, & D’Aveni (1992); D'Aveni, & Kesner (1993); 
Finkle (1998); Certo, Daily, & Dalton (2001); Jackson, & Hambrick 
(2002); Higgins, & Gulati (2002); Cohen, & Dean (2005). 
 
…influences the perceived credibility of corporate communication… Higgins, & Bannister (1992); Hirst, Koonce, & Miller (1999); Mercer 
(2004). 
 
Underwriter reputation increases the performance of initial public 
offerings 
 
Balvers, McDonald, & Miller (1988); Carter, & Manaster (1990); Carter, 
Dark, & Singh (1998).  
Auditor personal reputation increases the performance of initial public 
offerings 
 
Beatty, & Ritter (1986); Balvers, McDonald, & Miller (1988); Beatty 
(1989). 
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TABLE 2. Corporate reputation in financial markets: some illustrative cases 
ALITALIA (AIRLINE TRANSPORTATION) 
Alitalia, the Italian national carrier, has traditionally 
suffered from poor reputation among the general public 
and the financial community. Until very recently, 
arguable appointments in the managerial ranks and 
vague and ambiguous industrial plans have increasingly 
undermined the investors’ confidence in the capacity of 
the company to carry out a much needed restructuring 
(see Table 3).  
BANCA INTESA (BANKING) 
Banca Intesa is one of the largest banking group in Italy. 
In recent times, the solid reputation of a newly-hired 
CEO and his personal involvement in investor relations 
and communication to financial markets is credited for 
the recover of the group’s poor reputation among 
financial analysts (see Tables 2 and 3).    
BIPOP (BANKING) 
In the late 90’s, Bipop Carire, a medium-sized regional 
bank, was widely acclaimed by the press and the 
financial community for its aggressive growth strategies. 
In 2001, despite general recognition of the quality of the 
corporate strategies, its credibility among the financial 
community collapsed, after an investigation revealed the 
improper functioning of internal control systems. Its 
stock price plummeted and a few months later the bank 
was taken over by a larger competitor (see Table 4).  
CAPITALIA (BANKING) 
Capitalia is one of the five major Italian banks. In recent 
times, its alleged involvement in financial scandals, such 
as Parmalat and Cirio, and a perceived lack of 
transparency regarding some of its financial operations 
had severely tarnished its reputation in the financial 
community. The appointment of a young and well 
regarded CEO and the personal integrity of the new 
overseer of internal control systems helped the company 
recover credibility in financial markets (see Tables 2 and 
4).    
E.BISCOM/FASTWEB (TLC) 
Fastweb, formerly known as e.Biscom, is the leading 
broadband telecommunications company in Italy. 
Founded in 1999, its IPO witnessed the astounding 
number – for Italy – of two million subscribers. Since 
then, the company hasn’t reported profits. However, 
consensus has never faltered, also thanks to the personal 
prestige of its top management team and the impeccable 
quality of its industrial plans (see Tables 2 and 3).    
 
INDESIT (WHITE GOODS) 
Indesit is one of the top three manufactures in the 
European white goods industry. In recent years, 
effective internal controls systems and the deep 
involvement of former CEO Andrea Guerra in investor 
relations helped tighten up the consensus of investors 
around a bold growth strategy (see Tables 2 and 4). 
SABAF (VALVES, THERMOSTATS AND BURNERS) 
Sabaf is a world leader in the production of components 
for domestic gas cooking appliances. Despite its 
relatively small size and its low popularity among the 
general public, it is one of the best regarded companies 
in the Milan Stock Exchange. The personal competence 
of its CEO, and its articulation in illustrating the 
companies plans and economics is credited for its high 
reputation among financial analysts (see Table 2).  
TELECOM ITALIA (ICT) 
In the late 90’s, despite its high profitability, Telecom 
Italia, the ex state-owned national telecommunication 
provider, had experienced troubled relationships with 
the financial community because of unclear strategic 
plans and ambiguous financial communication (see 
Table 3). In the last few years, improved corporate 
communication and effective internal control systems 
have helped regain consensus around a challenging 
growth strategy (see Table 4).  
TOD’S (SHOES, LEATHER GOODS AND CASUAL WEAR) 
Tod’s is a global luxury group, manufacturing and selling 
brands such as Tod’s, Fay and Hogan. The company is 
held in high regard among financial analysts, mainly 
because of the personal charisma and competence of its 
chairman and CEO, Diego Della Valle. Mr. Della Valle’s 
long involvement in the family firm helped him develop 
a profound knowledge of the business, which he 
displays as he periodically encounters financial analysts 
to illustrate his company’s plans (see Table 2).    
UNICREDITO (BANKING) 
Unicredito, Italy’s largest banking group in terms of 
market capitalisation, has earned a solid reputation for 
transparency and financial disclosure. Since its 
foundation in 1998, its CEO Alessandro Profumo has 
been actively involved in investor relations, providing a 
clear explication of its strategic intentions and action 
plans, and keeping investors constantly informed about 
the implementation of the proposed plans (see Tables 2 
and 3).  
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 FIGURE 1. Building reputation in financial markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC PLANS 
  Illustrate and explain causal links 
between trends, intents, actions, and 
results  Provide details on the 
implementation of plans  Periodic follow-up on advances 
INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
  Clear separation between internal 
control and managerial responsibilities  Voluntary disclosure about auditing 
practices   Internal auditors’ personal reputation 
for rigor and integrity 
 
LEADERSHIP 
  Reputation for past achievements  Personal involvement in investor 
relations   Profound business experience and 
hands-on approach 
REPUTATION ON 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
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 TABLE 3. Building reputation in financial markets: A committed and credible leadership 
Features Examples 
CEO’s personal 
reputation for past 
achievements  
 In 2002, the appointment of Corrado Passera as CEO of Banca Intesa helped the company 
regain credibility and consensus among financial analysts. Earlier on, as CEO of Poste Italiane, 
Mr Passera had been able to lead an inertial, state-owned company through successful 
restructuring, significantly improving corporate image and recovering from poor performance. 
Part of its strategy involved a successful diversification in the banking industry, which had 
made of Poste Italiane a major player in the arena.    Before joining Capitalia, Matteo Arpe had earned a personal reputation for competence and 
rigour at prestigious merchant banks Mediobanca and Lehman Brothers. At the time of his 
appointment as CEO, in July 2003, Capitalia was suffering from its alleged involvement in 
major financial scandals. His arrival is credited for helping the company rebuilding its 
credibility within the financial community.  In the early 2000, when e.Biscom went public, the company was merely a start-up in the 
uncertain field of telecommunications. Founder and CEO Silvio Scaglia, however, had built 
and developed Omnitel, the first non-public mobile telecommunication provider in Italy. His 
personal reputation and prestige is credited for having raised more than 1.6 billion euros from 
institutional investors as well as the general public, for an entrepreneurial initiative that would 
not have generated profit before five years. 
Personal involvement 
of the CEO in 
investor relations and 
financial 
communication 
 At Unicredito, CEO Alessandro Profumo is often directly involved in investor relations. Not 
only does he illustrate personally the plans of the company, but he also regularly attends 
meetings with financial analysts and institutional investors to discuss strategic plans, annual 
and quarterly results, and future growth prospects. Also thanks to his personal involvement, 
Unicredito has earned a solid reputation for transparency and financial disclosure.  When Andrea Guerra left Indesit in 2004, the company’s shares went down by more than 2% 
in one day. In the past few years, Mr. Guerra had been able to build excellent relationships 
with financial analysts and institutional investors by providing them with comprehensive 
information necessary for their decision making process. Mr Guerra had granted the company 
the consensus of the financial community around its market aggressive strategies leveraging on 
the accountability of its well-regarded management.   Fastweb’s management has always been clear that the company would not have reached break 
even before 2005. All along, Mr. Scaglia’s deep involvement in investor relations was crucial in 
preserving the consensus of the financial community around his daring and innovative strategy 
and in reassuring analysts and investors about his personal commitment to it. 
CEO’s profound 
knowledge of the 
business 
 Despite recent poor operational performance, the consensus of the financial community 
around the innovative strategy of Tod’s has never faltered. Indeed, the company CEO has 
proved to share a profound knowledge of the commercial and industrial aspects of the luxury 
business, which is credited for the establishment of a general attitude of trust towards the 
company and its future prospects.   While working as CEO for Omnitel, Silvio Scaglia, founder of e.Biscom had developed a deep 
knowledge of the telecommunication business, its key value drivers and its fundamental 
economics. In 1999, despite being only one of the many TLC start-ups founded at that time, 
e.Biscom was able to gather the financial backing needed to become in a short time one of the 
major players in broadband telecommunications. Mr. Scaglia’s personal competence and 
experience in the filed reassured analysts and investors about the company’s capacity to carry 
out its ambitious plans.   Sabaf is a world leader in the production of components for domestic gas cooking appliances. 
Despite its relatively small size and its low popularity among the general public, it is one of the 
best regarded companies in the Milan Stock Exchange. The personal competence of its CEO 
is credited for its high reputation among financial analysts. Having worked in the same 
industry for more than 40 years and in the same company for more than 30, Angelo Bettinzoli, 
has developed a rare insight and an outstanding capacity to articulate the competitive and 
economic implications of the company’s plans.  
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TABLE 4. Building reputation in financial markets: Detailed and accountable strategic 
plans 
 
Features Examples 
Clear explication of 
the causal 
relationships linking 
environmental  trends, 
strategic intentions, 
action plans and end 
results 
 Unicredito enjoys an excellent reputation in financial markets. On the one, its innovative, risky 
strategy is consistent with the expectations of the financial community for two-digit growth. On the 
other hand, the credibility of its strategic plans is enhanced by providing financial analysts and 
investors with balanced and detailed information about the company’s goals, action plans, and 
expected results.   In 1998, the newly established managers of recently privatized Telecom Italia presented a three-year 
strategic plan. The documents illustrated to the financial community, however, contained serious 
discrepancies with the content and the figures of a plan presented to the trade unions only a week 
earlier. Such ambiguity severely damaged the credibility and the reputation of the company among the 
financial community. Despite sustained profits, in three months, company shares went down by 47%.  In 2001, Alitalia was facing a serious financial crisis: in the first semester, the company had lost 2.60 
billion euros and even greater losses were expected in the second. The top management team 
proposed a capital increase of 1.55 billion euros. However, the strategic plan that accompanied the 
proposal and should have laid out the restructuring plan was vague and unclear about the destination 
of the capital. Financial analysts and institutional investors were disconcerted and the shaky plan dealt 
a further blow to the credibility of the company.  
Supply of detailed 
information about the 
implementation of the 
proposed plans 
 At Unicredito, periodic presentations of strategic plans to analysts and institutional investors are 
structured around a detailed articulation of the general plan into divisional sub-plans. Every divisional 
manager personally illustrates how corporate plans will be implemented in their units and indicates 
managers responsible to carry out the plans.   Although Banca Intesa has developed a bold, aggressive market strategy, the consensus of the 
financial community around company’s strategic plans has never faltered. At Banca Intesa, the 
credibility and accountability of managers’ claims is reinforced through the ample supply of 
information about the implementation of the proposed plans, by providing details about the key 
resources and competences the plans will rely on.  Fastweb, founded in 1999 as e.Biscom, operates in the highly uncertain and dynamic 
telecommunication industry. Since its IPO in 2000, the management of the company has been clear 
that break even would not be reached before 2005. The confidence of analysts and investors, 
however, has never waned. In order to constantly reassure the financial community, Fastweb 
managers have always provided detailed information about the current implementation of their plans, 
thus increasing confidence in their capacity to successfully carry out their challenging strategy.  
Periodic follow-ups 
on the advances 
towards the expected 
results 
 In order to reassure investors and analysts about their capacity to meet medium- and long-term 
financial goals, managers at Fastweb have constantly provided indications of the extent to which 
corporate performance has met short-term goals and expectations. In the latest industrial plan (2005-
2013), a summary table compares forecasts and actual results since the foundation of the company, 
including later revisions presented to the financial community.   Capitalia’s attempts to recover from poor reputation benefited from a revision of the content of their 
strategic communication, which more clearly linked expected and actual results by periodically 
updating priorities and targets presented in previous strategic plans. For instance, the 2003 plan 
recalled the priorities identified at an earlier stage – i.e. asset quality, capital and risk management, 
disposal of non core assets, management and corporate culture, revenue enhancement and focus on 
costs – and, for each of them, illustrated the results obtained until then and the expected new targets.       Every year, during the so-called “Investor Day”, the top management team of Unicredito presents 
follow-ups on the advances towards the expected results indicated in previous industrial plans. In 
2004, top managers were not afraid to revise company returns downwards, as, in the words of CEO 
Alessandro Profumo, “we prefer to revise targets earlier on rather than to divulge belated profit 
warnings, thus damaging our company’s reputation.”   
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 TABLE 5. Building reputation in financial markets: effective and independent internal 
control systems 
Features Examples 
Voluntary 
disclosure of 
information about 
the auditing 
practices 
 
 At Indesit, uncommon disclosure of information about the company’s internal control systems 
has helped reinforcing the consensus of the financial community around an ambitious strategy, 
based on acquisitions and geographical expansion. The company periodically provides 
extensive information about the structure and functioning of its internal control systems, 
disclosing voluntary information regarding its policies and practices.   In the late 2004, in light of major corporate changes, Telecom Italia illustrated in details its 
auditing practices and risk management policies, in order to reassure analysts and investors 
about the effectiveness of its internal control systems. The presentation touched issues such as 
the personal background of members of the auditing committee and the organizational 
location of internal auditing structures. 
Clear distinction 
between control 
duties and 
managerial 
responsibilities 
 In late 2001, results from an investigation of the Bank of Italy, the Italian authority for the 
banking industry, pointed at the poor performance of the internal control systems of Bipop. In 
particular, the investigation revealed that internal controls were demanded to formal bodies 
with no substantial power. Internal controllers were in fact heavily influenced by the top 
management. Divulgation of these results dealt a fatal blow to the reputation of the company.   At Indesit, the decision to locate the internal control system manager in the Chairman’s staff 
was meant to reinforce and signal its independence from operating officers, and to confer 
credibility to the internal control systems of the company. Clear separation between control 
and managerial responsibilities is emphasized also in the corporate governance report of the 
company.   At Telecom Italia, the responsibility for the revision of internal control systems for the whole 
group of companies, is assigned to an autonomous subsidiary, Telecom Italia Audit, reporting 
directly to the Chairman of the company. Telecom Italia takes great care in underlining the fact 
that employees of Telecom Italia Audit do not have any managerial responsibilities in Telecom 
Italia, and are therefore independent from the rest of the managerial ranks.  
Internal auditors’ 
personal reputation 
for integrity and 
rigor  
 In 2004, Giuseppe Cannizzaro, a former member of Consob (the Italian equivalent of the 
SEC), was appointed central director and legal counsellor of Capitalia. His appointment 
reinforced the idea that Capitalia was striving to improve the effectiveness of its internal 
control systems, to increase the accountability of its innovative and daring strategies. 
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TABLE 6. Building reputation in financial markets: A summary  
Convincing leaders … Effective strategic plans … Credible control systems feature … 
 Have a solid reputation for past achievements 
in related businesses or assignments  Display their commitment and responsiveness 
to the financial community by personally engaging in 
investor relations  Display a profound knowledge of the business 
and an outstanding capacity to articulate their plans  Are willing to discuss their plans personally  
with analysts and investors 
 
 Provide clear and consistent information about 
the strategic intents and expected results  Explain clearly causal linkages between 
environmental trends, strategic intents, action plans 
and end results  Provide detailed information about the 
implementation of the proposed strategies  Provide systematic follow-ups about previously 
presented plans 
 
 Respected and rigorous internal auditors  Clear demarcation between internal auditors 
and the managerial hierarchies  A broad scope of auditing practices 
encompassing financial, legal and operational aspects 
of the business, and an adequate size of the auditing 
structures   Voluntary disclosure of detailed information 
beyond the legal requirements 
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